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Abstract: In this study, we propose a blind digital signature (BDS) scheme based on the elliptic curve digital signature
algorithm that increases the performance signiﬁcantly. The security of our scheme is based on the diﬃculty of the elliptic
curve discrete algorithm problem. Therefore, it oﬀers much smaller key lengths for the desired security levels, along with
much faster cryptographic processes, leading to fewer hardware and software requirements. According to our simulation
results, the relative performance improvement of our proposed BDS scheme is up to 96% when compared with previously
proposed schemes.
Key words: Blind digital signature, elliptic curve digital signature algorithm, elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem,
digital privacy

1. Introduction and related work
Nowadays people can accomplish their daily tasks, such as banking transactions, without leaving their homes
by using the Internet. People also carry out their shopping needs through the Internet, which has increased
the growing rate of e-commerce. Now the challenge is to improve the security and anonymity of people in
this uncontrollable and dangerous Internet environment. As a solution, we use the concept of the blind digital
signature (BDS) presented in [1]. Since 1983, several applications of BDS have been developed through the
e-commerce and e-voting ﬁelds.
The veriﬁcation of data using any methods of information technology is called “electronic signature”.
“Digital signature” is a special kind of electronic signature, which uses public key cryptography (PKC) algorithms to provide data integrity and authenticity. The function of a digital signature is to prevent forged
signatures that cannot be distinguished from the original ones and to prevent the modiﬁcation of the original
documents. The aim of a digital signature is to form an electronic basis for the replacement of handwritten
signatures. Today, digital signatures are used for identifying the owners of electronic data. The existence of
reliable digital signatures that are being used to secure online transactions, such as web-based ﬁnancial transactions, motivates individuals and corporations to use digital signatures on a widespread basis. Suﬃciently
reliable digital signature schemes expedite the process of maintaining the obligation of the digital signatures in
justice.
Privacy is one of the basic rights for individuals and institutions that need to preserve their conﬁdentiality.
BDS is presented as a special application of digital signatures with a distinct property of blindness (unlinkability),
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and it can be used in many applications of cryptography where user privacy is important, such as digital voting
systems, digital payment systems, online transactions, or electronic government services [1–6].
Digital signature is used for identifying the owners of electronic data, and it thereby assures the traceability of electronic transactions. On the other hand, BDS disguises the content of a message from its signer
and thereby assures the privacy of the users. Chaum [1] pioneered the concept of BDS, and he later applied
this method to establish customer privacy in electronic payment systems [7]. He attained this by altering the
traditional digital signature algorithm (DSA) in an intelligent way.
The BDS scheme involves 2 parties, namely a “signer” and a signature “requester”. The scheme allows
the requester to have the message signed by the signer without revealing any information about the message.
With a secure BDS scheme, the signer is unable to trace the signed message to the previous signing process,
where the requester cannot be traced while using the signed message. For example, a bank can sign an electronic
coin without seeing its serial number and later cannot distinguish this particular electronic coin from others.
Since the customer’s transactions cannot be traced, the privacy of the customer is ensured.
BDS is used to provide user anonymity and the unlinkability of electronic transactions, which prevents
the signer from linking a blinded message he signed to the unblinded version that he may be asked to verify. The
signed blinded message is unblinded prior to veriﬁcation in such a way that the signature remains valid for the
unblinded version of the message. This is a very important feature to ensure user privacy. Hence, BDS schemes
can guarantee the anonymity of the customers in secure electronic payment systems [7,8] and the privacy of the
voters in secure electronic voting systems [9–11].
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is one of the latest methods of PKC, which is becoming more attractive
for researchers. This is because it not only increases the security, but also decreases the resource requirements
at the same time. ECC oﬀers the same security level with a shorter key length [12]. It is clear that no one
can regret such a property in security systems nowadays, where increasing the security level is a requirement.
This is an appealing development, especially for security applications used in resource-limited devices (where
“resources” are the processor speed, memory size, and power supplies [i.e. batteries] of said devices), such as
smart cards, cell phones, and other similar palm devices. Therefore, the applications that use ECC on such
devices will require fewer processor loops, less memory size, smaller key lengths, and less power consumption
when compared with the applications using other PKC algorithms such as the Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA)
algorithm [13] or the DSA [14].
With growing potential in e-commerce, ECC systems will be considered to be an important alternative
solution to ensure security. Since they increase the security level per bit compared to the other traditional PKC
algorithms, the required hardware capacity also decreases. This is a property of prime importance in systems
where the computing resources are limited. Thus, together with ECC systems, we can generate not only high
speed hardware implementations, but also robust systems against any known attacks towards PKC systems.
Elliptic curve DSA (ECDSA) [15] helps us in the application of this cryptography approach (ECC) to
digital signatures. It was developed to match the properties of today’s standardized DSA [14]. In this paper,
in order to generate eﬀective and satisfactory BDSs, we present an eﬃcient method of ECDSA. This work is
based on our previous research published in [16].
In this study, we propose a BDS scheme that oﬀers an increased performance in terms of processing time
compared to its counterparts. The relative performance improvement of our scheme is up to 96% compared to
that in [1] and up to 66% compared to that in [17]. In our proposed scheme, we achieve this by employing ECC
(i.e. ECDSA), which is superior to the other cryptography algorithms, such as RSA or DSA.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief introduction to the concept
of BDS. Section 3 presents our proposed BDS scheme. Section 4 includes the analysis and simulation results
to provide a comparison of our proposed scheme to the schemes presented in [1] and [17]. Finally, Section 5
concludes the paper and outlines the future work.

2. Brief introduction to BDS
BDS is a method of signing in such a way that the signer does not see the content of the document. Moreover,
if the signer sees the document/sign pair, he cannot determine for whom or when the document has been signed
(although it is possible to verify the validity of the signature). This is equivalent to signing a document blindly.
We can verify the signature if we see the document and signature, but it is clear that we would need to remember
when or for whom we have signed the document. Initially, this concept may be seen as rather strange – why do
we need to sign a document without reading it? It has been shown that this concept can eﬃciently be applied
to systems where user privacy is of primary signiﬁcance. Online voting and electronic payment are very good
examples of these systems: when we vote online, we would like to keep secret for whom we voted, just the same
as in the case of voting with ballots. When shopping with cash money, a customer does not show an ID to a
vendor (in most of the cases, assuming age restrictions are fulﬁlled). Moreover, the vendor does not recognize
the customer, but can tell whether the customer’s money is forged or not. In the same manner, through an
online transaction, we do not want anybody to learn when or what we have paid for, but a vendor would be
able to verify the legitimacy of our payment.
The ﬁrst BDS scheme that appears in the cryptography literature is based on the factoring algorithm
problem proposed by Chaum [1]. According to Chaum’s BDS scheme, there are 5 phases of initialization,
blinding, signing, unblinding, and verifying, and a BDS scheme must satisfy the following properties:
• Correctness: The correctness of the signature of a message signed through the proposed BDS scheme
can be checked by anyone using the signer’s public key.
• Blindness: The content of the message should be blind to the signer.
• Unforgeability: The signature is the proof of the signer, and no one else can derive any forged signature
and pass it through the veriﬁcation.
• Unlinkability: The signer of the BDS is unable to link the message/signature pair, even when the
signature has been revealed to the public.
In [1], a BDS transaction has 2 parties, namely the requester and signer. When a requester requires a
BDS of the signer in response to a message, the system blinds the message by multiplying with a blinding factor.
Next, the requester sends the blinded message to the signer. The signer signs the blind message using his own
private key, and then sends the resultant BDS to the requester. Afterwards, the requester unblinds (extracts)
the signer’s digital signature from the message by deducting the blinding factor. At the end of the transaction,
the requester obtains the signer’s signature in the original message without revealing the original message to
the signer. The signer’s public key can be used for authentication purposes (to authenticate the signature when
needed).
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BÜTÜN and DEMİRER/Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

3. Proposed BDS scheme
In [17], the proposed BDS scheme was derived from a variation of the DSA. Our BDS scheme, meanwhile, is
derived from a variation of the ECDSA, and again it has 5 phases:
• Initialization,
• Blinding,
• Signing,
• Unblinding,
• Verifying.
In our proposed scheme, we used the elliptic curves over the Fp prime ﬁeld, which has been suggested by
the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) and is called Federal Information Processing Standard
186-2 [18,19].
According to the Standards for Eﬃcient Cryptography Group [20], elliptic curve domain parameters over
Fp are deﬁned as a sextuple:
T = (p, Fp abGnh),

(1)

where pis an integer specifying theFp ﬁnite ﬁeld and ab ∈ Fp are integers specifying the elliptic curve E(Fp )
deﬁned by Eq. (2):
E (Fp ) : y2 ≡ x3 + ax + b (mod p),

(2)

where G = (xG yG )is a base point onE(Fp ), n is a prime number deﬁning the order of G , and h is an integer
deﬁning the cofactor: h = #

E(Fp )
n

.

3.1. Initialization and key pair generation for ECDSA
The signer deﬁnes the elliptic curve domain parameters T , deﬁned as in Eq. (1). Next, for each request, an
integer k is randomly selected by the user and the elliptic curve point Ŕ is calculated accordingly (refer to
Table 1 for all abbreviations used in this section):
Ŕ = kG = (x´1 ,y´1 ),

(3)

ŕ = x´1 (mod n).

(4)

In addition, the signer checks whether Eq. (5) holds.
ŕ = 0

(5)

If the result is true, the signer sends the elliptic curve point Ŕ to the requester. If the result is false, then the
signer selects another k randomly and repeats Eqs. (3) and (4) until he ﬁnds an ŕ fulﬁlling Eq. (5).
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Table 1. Interpretation of abbreviations used throughout Section 3.

Abbreviation
T
p
Fp
a, b
G
n
h
ECC
ECDSA
H(:)
d
Q
m
ḿ
s
ś
r
ŕ
R, Ŕ
A, B, k
(xy)

Interpretation
Elliptic curve domain parameters
Order of the ﬁnite ﬁeld Fp , integer
Finite ﬁeld
Coeﬃcients deﬁning the elliptic curve
Generator point
Order of G, a prime number
Cofactor, integer
Elliptic curve cryptography
Elliptic curve digital signature algorithm
Hash value
Private key of the signer
Public key of the signer, a point on the elliptic curve
Message
Blinded message
Signature
Blind signature
x coordinate of R
x coordinate of Ŕ
Points on the elliptic curve
Random integer numbers
Coordinates for the Cartesian system

To generate the private and public key of the signer, the following steps are followed:
1. Integer d is chosen randomly in the range (1, n-1).
2. The elliptic curve point of Q is calculated as in Eq. (6):
Q = dG = (xQ , yQ ) .

(6)

With these calculations, the public key of the signer is assigned as point Q and the private key of the signer is
assigned as integer d .
3.2. Blinding phase
In order to blind the message m, the owner of message m needs the elliptic curve domain parameters T of the
signer; refer to Eq. (1). Blinding is achieved through the following steps, which are shown in Figure 1:
1. Signer sends the elliptic point Ŕ (refer to Eq. (3)) to the requester, which will be used as the blinding
coeﬃcient.
2. Requester calculates ŕ from the elliptic point Ŕ , as shown in Eq. (4).
3. Requester randomly chooses integers A and B , which are in the range of (1, n-1).
4. Requester calculates the elliptic point R :
R = AŔ + BG = (x1 y1 ).

(7)
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5. Requester calculates r from the elliptic point R , which was given in Eq. (7):
r = x1 (mod n).

(8)

6. Requester generates the blinded message ḿ and sends it back to the signer for the signing operation:
ḿ = A H (m) ŕ r −1 (mod n),

(9)

where H is the “Hash” function, and in our scheme, we use the SHA-1 [21] algorithm as the hash function.
3.3. Signing phase
After the signer receives the blinded message ḿ from the requester, he generates the blind signature ś by
following these steps, which are also shown in Figure 1:
1. Signer calculates ŕ from the elliptic point Ŕ , as shown in Eq. (4).
2. The private key of the signer, d , was generated in the initialization phase.
3. k is a random integer that was generated in the initialization phase.
4. ś is calculated as shown in Eq. (10):
ś = dŕ + k ḿ (mod n).

(10)
Reques ter

m

Plain Text

Find 2 random
integers less than n
A, B < n

H

H(m)

Hash Function

R =AR’+BG=(x1,y1)
r=x1 modn
r'=x1' modn

$[&^ .2-p6\#

m'=AH(m)r’r -1
Blinded Message : m’

Signer

Signer’s
secret key : d

Signer sends the
elliptic point :
R’= (x1',y1')

s' : digital signature of
the blinded message m’
s' = (dr’ + km’) mod n

% +!q0(7v+

Figure 1. “Blinding” and “Signing” phases of the proposed BDS scheme.
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3.4. Unblinding phase
When the requester receives the blind digital signature ś from the signer, the unblinding operation is needed
to obtain the digital signature (s, R) on message m, as shown in Figure 2.
1. Requester calculates ŕ from the elliptic point Ŕ , as shown in Eq. (4).
2. Requester veriﬁes whether ŕ and ś are in the range of (1, n-1). If so, the requester generates the digital
signature (s, R) of the signer on message m, as shown in Eq. (11):
s = ś r ŕ −1 + BH (m) (mod n).

(11)

Signer
S’ : digital signature of the
blinded message m’
%+!+%/&%

Signer sends the elliptic
points : R’= (x1', y1') and G

Public key of the signer: Q

S = (s’r(r’)^-1 + BH(m)) mod n

The digital signature (s, R) on
m, obtained from blind digital
signature (s’) of the signer
#$g9%&+/!

Elliptic curve domain
parameter : G

m

Plain Text

s

G

Requester

Hash Function

R = x1 mod n

R
H (m)

=$#&%+/!’

r

H

Q

(rQ + H(m)R) mod n

( s G ) modn

=$#&%+/!’

=$#&%+/!’

Are equal ?

s
Ye

no

Verifier

Figure 2. “Unblinding” and “Verifying” phases of the proposed BDS scheme.
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3.5. Verifying phase
Any party that has the elliptic domain parameters T of the signer (refer to Eq. (1)) can verify the digital
signature of (s, R) on message m by following these steps, which are also shown in Figure 2:
u1 = sG (mod n).

(12)

u2 is calculated using the public key of the signer, Q :
u2 = rQ + H (m) R (mod n).

(13)

If the statement of u1 = u2 is met, then the signature is veriﬁed as valid; otherwise, it is considered invalid.
3.6. Correctness proof of the proposed scheme
We begin by expanding u2 , deﬁned in Eq. (13), by substituting Q with dG according to Eq. (6):
u2 = rdG + H (m) R (mod n).

(14)

Since from Eq. (7) we know that R = AŔ + BG , then we can expand Eq. (14) as follows:
u2 = rdG + H (m) AŔ + H (m) BG (mod n) .

(15)

Using Eq. (3), we substitute Ŕ with kG and we get:
u2 = rdG + H (m) AkG + H (m) BG (mod n)

.

(16)

Now, by expanding u1 , deﬁned in Eq. (12), we need to achieve the same expression shown in Eq. (16). Since
from Eq. (11) we know that s = ś r ŕ −1 + BH (m) (mod n), then Eq. (12) becomes:
u1 = ś r ŕ −1 G + BH (m) G (mod n).

(17)

By substituting ś with dŕ + k ḿ (mod n) from Eq. (10), Eq. (17) results in:
u1 = dŕ r ŕ −1 G + k ḿ r ŕ −1 G + BH (m) G (mod n).

(18)

By rearranging Eq. (18) we get:
u1 = rdGŕŕ −1 + k ḿ r ŕ −1 G + H (m) BG (mod n).

(19)

From Eq. (9), substituting ḿ with A H (m) ŕ r −1 (mod n) in Eq. (19) results in:
u1 = rdGŕŕ −1 + k A H (m) ŕ r −1 r ŕ −1 G + H (m) BG (mod n).

(20)

From modular arithmetic, we know that ŕŕ −1 = 1 (mod n) and rr −1 = 1 (mod n). By substituting these into
Eq. (20) we get:
u1 = rdG + k A H (m) G + H (m) BG (mod n).

(21)

Eq. (21) is the same expression shown in Eq. (16). Therefore, we have proven that u1 = u2 by showing that
Eqs. (16) and (21) are equal to the same expression.
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4. Simulation results and discussions
In the applications, the key length of the algorithm is determined according to the desired security level. Today,
it is most practical to use a key length of between 160 and 192 bits for ECC systems. In the case of RSA, the
key length is 1024 bits for commercial applications and 2048 bits for more critical applications (where more
security is needed). These key lengths correspond to the 192-bit and 224-bit ECC key lengths, respectively [22].
While the security of Chaum’s BDS scheme [1] is based on the diﬃculty of the factorization problem [23],
the security of Camenisch et al.’s BDS scheme [17] is based on the diﬃculty of the discrete logarithm problem
[24]. On the other hand, the security of our BDS scheme relies on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem,
which is considered to be much more diﬃcult than either of the other problems [12].
In our work, to provide comparisons for the reader, the implementation and simulation of both the BDS
schemes of [1] and [17] have been accomplished. A 1024-bit RSA key length is chosen for the implementation
of [1] and a 1024-bit DSA key length is chosen for the implementation of [17]. To provide further comparison
for the reader, we have issued our scheme with a variety of NIST-suggested elliptic curves (NIST192, NIST224,
NIST256, NIST384, and NIST521). This means that the key length of our scheme changes depending on the
curve (192 bits, 224 bits, 256 bits, 384 bits, and 521 bits, respectively). For example, if the NIST192 elliptic
curve is chosen for our scheme, then the key length is apparently 192 bits.
The test-bed system consists of a 1733-MHz processor with 512 MB of DDR-2 533-MHz RAM. Implementation is based upon the C programming language. For elliptic curve arithmetic operations, Miracle Library
is used [25].
In order to compare the time consumptions of the algorithms, the clock command of the C programming
language has been used. It gives the time that is spent on the processor between 2 events. For the same plain
text message (m consists of 431 bytes), the time (in seconds) spent on the processor for the relevant algorithms
is given in Figure 3.
0.7
0.6

Chaum
Chamenish
NIST192
NIST224
NIST256
NIST384
NIST521

Time (s)

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

Blinding phase

Signing phase

Unblinding phase

Verifying phase

Figure 3. Comparisons of processing time for various BDS schemes classiﬁed according to phases.

Figure 3 is sorted according to the phases (blinding, signing, unblinding, and verifying) of the BDS
schemes, while Figure 4 is sorted according to the types of the BDS schemes (Chaum’s [1], Camenisch et al.’s
[17], and our scheme with the following elliptic curves: NIST192, NIST224, NIST256, NIST384, and NIST521).
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0.7
0.6
Blinding
Signing
Unblinding
Verifying

Time (s)

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

Chaum

Camenisch NIST192 NIST224 NIST256 NIST384

NIST521

Figure 4. Comparisons of processing times for various BDS schemes classiﬁed according to schemes .

Table 2 gives the processing time (s) of our scheme compared to other schemes, when the NIST192 elliptic
curve is used for our scheme. Table 3 gives the performance improvement (%) of our scheme compared to other
schemes, when the NIST192 elliptic curve is used for our scheme. In this case, it is clear that in terms of the
processing time, our scheme outperforms Chaum’s scheme [1] by about 96% and Camenisch et al.’s scheme [17]
by about 66%.
Table 2. Processing time (s) of BDS schemes.

Blinding phase
Signing phase
Unblinding phase
Verifying phase

Our scheme
0.0624
0.0218
0.0374
0.0470

Chaum’s scheme
0.5267
0.5156
0.0984
0.4971

Camenisch et al.’s scheme
0.0892
0.0641
0.0732
0.0499

Table 3. Relative performance improvement (%) of our scheme compared to other schemes.

Blinding phase
Signing phase
Unblinding phase
Verifying phase

Chaum’s scheme
88.15
95.77
61.99
90.55

Camenisch et al.’s scheme
30.04
65.99
48.90
5.81

For all of the phases (blinding, signing, unblinding, and verifying), the fastest scheme is the one proposed
in this study, which uses the NIST192 elliptic curve (in other words, the scheme that has a key length of 192 bits),
and the slowest of all is Chaum’s [1] scheme, which uses a 1024-bit RSA key length. It is important to mention
that the key lengths for the considered schemes are selected to provide equal security levels. For example, it
has been proven that the security levels of the 1024-bit key length RSA algorithm, 1024-bit key length DSA
algorithm, and 160-bit key length ECC algorithm are the same [26,27]. The computational eﬀort needed to
factor a 1024-bit size integer using the general number ﬁeld sieve method is 3 × 1011 million instructions per
second years, whereas the same eﬀort is needed to compute elliptic curve logarithms of the 160-bit size elliptic
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point with the Pollard ρ-method [12]. In [12], it is suggested that a 192-bit size NIST elliptic curve is comparable
to 1024-bit size RSA and DSA key lengths in terms of the intended cryptanalysis strength. Hence, we issued a
192-bit key length ECC algorithm, and, in this case, our scheme is not only faster but also more secure. Table
4 gives the comparable key sizes of the ECDSA and RSA/DSA algorithms in terms of the computational eﬀort
for cryptanalysis [28].
Table 4. Comparable key sizes in terms of the computational eﬀort for cryptanalysis [28].

ECDSA (size of the prime ﬁeld in bits)
112
160
224
256
384
512

RSA/DSA (modulus size in bits)
512
1024
2048
3072
7680
15,360

5. Conclusions and future remarks
In this study, we brieﬂy introduced the concept of BDS, and later on, our contribution to the ﬁeld was presented.
Our proposed BDS scheme has lower complexity (i.e. in terms of computational load) and provides better
security compared to those in [1] and [17].
Our proposed scheme uses ECC (ECDSA), providing all of its advantages over the other PKC algorithms.
It oﬀers smaller key lengths for desired security levels, along with high-speed cryptographic processes, leading to
low-complexity hardware and software requirements [12]. These advantages are indispensable for applications
where resource shortage is of prime importance, especially in mobile platforms. Our proposed scheme can
be used in the applications where not only user anonymity but also processing time is critical under certain
hardware constraints.
According to the results, our proposed scheme outperforms that in [1] by 96% and that in [17] by 66%
in terms of processing time. Thus, our proposed scheme leads to an apparent improvement in BDS systems.
Eventually, this enhancement will drastically reduce the total cost of the commercial systems that are using
BDS.
The application of our scheme to smart cards, e-commerce, and e-voting is left as future work for us to
consider.
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